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Issues in Agriculture is an evolving series on topics connected with agricultural
research and development. The series is published by the Secretariat of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) as a
contribution to informed discussion on issues that affect agriculture. The opinions
expressed in this series are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect a
consensus of views within the CGIAR System.
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About the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
The CGIAR is a unique global partnership with a compelling worldwide
agenda. Established in the early 1970s, the CGIAR works to promote food security,
poverty eradication, and the sound management of natural resources throughout the
developing world.  It is the largest scientific network of its kind.
CGIAR pursues these objectives through the activities of 16 international
research centers. CGIAR Members—58 industrial and developing countries, private
foundations, and regional and international organizations—provide vital financing,
technical support, and strategic direction. A host of other public and private
organizations work with the CGIAR as donors, research associates, and advisors.
The need for a special partnership within the agricultural research community
focused on fighting hunger and poverty through productivity-oriented research was
first recognized in the late 1960s, in response to the specter of widespread famine in
parts of Asia.  Leaders from 18 international organizations, foundations, and concerned
governments formally joined together in 1971 as the first Members of the CGIAR.
Through their continuing support, hundreds of new wheat and rice varieties were
developed, released, and planted in developing countries, adding an estimated US$50
billion to the value of world food supplies over two decades.
To build on these achievements, new CGIAR Centers were founded to work
with national research institutions in pioneering improvements in other key food crops,
such as legumes, roots, tubers and other cereals, and to concentrate on better
management of livestock. Centers were established to work on the problems of dry,
semi-arid, and tropical regions, and to conduct research on forestry, agroforestry,
water management, fisheries and marine resources. Centers were also set up to
analyze national and international food policies, and to build the capacity of
agricultural research at the national level.
Today, 16 CGIAR Centers around the world are harnessing cutting-edge
knowledge to help meet the world’s enormous food needs—with a steadfast allegiance
to scientific excellence and the public welfare. The advances made through CGIAR
research are international public goods; new plant varieties, pest control methods, and
resource management technologies are available free to all interested parties.
CGIAR’s Mission: To contribute to food security and poverty eradication in
developing countries through research, partnership, capacity building, and policy
support, promoting sustainable agricultural development based on the environmentally
sound management of natural resources.”
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The Third Distinguished Economist Lecture was presented by Professor Carl Eicher at
the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), in Mexico City,
on January 15, 1999, and a revised version was published by CIMMYT. The CGIAR
Secretariat is republishing the lecture as part of the Issues in Agriculture series and
extends thanks to Professor Eicher and CIMMYT.
Abstract:  Getting African agriculture moving is the most complex and demanding
task facing policymakers, agricultural scientists, and donors over the coming 25 years.
This publication, based on the text of a presentation given at the CIMMYT Economics
Program’s third Distinguished Economist lecture, examines Africa’s empty harvest in
historical perspective and analyzes the failure of agricultural institutions imported
from other continents (e.g., T&V extension and the land grant university model). The
author argues that there is an urgent need for African agriculturalists to experiment
with different agricultural institutions and to craft national “agricultural knowledge
triangles” that include research, extension, and agricultural higher education.  Africa’s
universities are the weak link in the agricultural knowledge triangle.  The lecture then
analyzes the reasons underlying the erosion in the capacity of Africa’s faculties of
agriculture to offer high quality graduate training in agriculture.  Taking the long view
of building sustainable agricultural institutions, the author outlines eight challenging
puzzles that require debate and further study: creating a good institutional
environment; crafting agricultural knowledge triangles; the case for long-term
scientific assistance; the expanded aid agenda; changing roles of public and private
institutions and NGOs; institution building versus marginalist approaches; strategic
issues in improving the quality of graduate education; and “whither the CGIAR.”
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1Institutions and the African Farmer
CARL K. EICHER
We have to work with some hope that there is a new generation, a
group of survivors who have learned something from the disaster.
– Chinua Achebe, 1979
African hunger and famine have lost their shock value, butnot their impact. People are hungry. AIDS has joinedfamine as a silent killer. And after 40 years of
independence, African leaders and Africa’s institutions have failed
their people. Donors and academics share this onus. Indeed,
prospects appear bleak in a land of promise.
Africa is muddling through, ill-prepared to cope with the
awesome task of dealing simultaneously with short-term food
emergencies and the long-term challenge of feeding an extra half
billion people over the next 20 to 25 years. Afro-pessimism has
spread like a plague across the continent, invading the spirit of
Africans and undermining the resolve of academics and foreign aid
workers. Africa’s chronic food crisis engulfs the continent like
harmattan dust from the Sahara. To be sure, the harmattan will
return every year, but there is no valid reason why Africa’s
agricultural crisis cannot be solved.
The primary cause of Africa’s underdevelopment is a seamless
web of internal and external factors rather than a single source such
as colonialism, geography, a lack of technology, corruption, or the
exploitative economic policies of both the North and the South. At
the dawn of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
industrial fundamentalism ruled the day. Agriculture was viewed as
a backward sector with slim prospects of becoming the motor of
2development. It was assumed that industry could be developed in
isolation from agriculture and that rapid industrialization would
enable new nations to leapfrog over the agrarian stage and catch up
with industrial nations by the year 2000. Industrialization, however,
has failed to materialize and the continent is mired in an agrarian
stage of development with two-thirds of its people deriving their
livelihood from agriculture and the rural economy.
Africa’s empty harvest of food crops and the loss of markets for
some of its traditional export crops represent a tragedy in a land of
agricultural potential and a continent of hard-working people with a
thirst for education, healthy babies, and a better life. Many countries
in Africa have enormous physical potential to produce food and
traditional agricultural exports for themselves, neighboring
countries, and international markets. But Africa’s vast agricultural
potential is not being tapped. Tapping this potential is a major
challenge for the African scientific community and the CGIAR
system.1 Unfortunately, the recent report by the expert panel on the
future of the CGIAR does not shed much light on Africa’s agrarian
crisis (CGIAR 1998). The report, prepared under the leadership of
Maurice Strong, devotes one of its 29 recommendations to the
African crisis. However, the Africa recommendation consists of eight
banal “assignments” to CGIAR centers without either identifying
which center activities should be shelved in order to finance an
expanded program in Africa or, alternatively, citing a source of
additional financial resources for the proposed assignments.2
1 The CGIAR is an umbrella organization that oversees the work of the 16 international
agricultural research centers.
2 Africa Recommendation: “The Panel recommends a special collaborative focus on Africa that
incorporates the following elements . . . (1) Promote national/regional consultative processes for
agricultural research and development; (2) Set up an African Capacity Building Initiative for
Sustainable Food Security as a major inter-Center initiative; (3) Set up a task force to develop a
special focused program for African food security; (4) Launch a well-planned Lab to Land
Program; (5) Develop research programs in urban and peri-urban agriculture; (6) Emphasize
modern ecological farming methods; (7) Set priorities on staple or relevant food crops; and
(8) Promote partnerships between strong NARS from various parts of the world and strategic
African NARS” (CGIAR 1998).
3Africa is also facing human capital degradation and
institutional decay arising from the AIDS pandemic, the decline in
the quality of its universities, and the on-going brain drain (African
Development Bank 1998). Currently, most of the 48 nations in sub-
Saharan Africa do not possess the political commitment and the
minimum threshold of scientific capacity to benefit from, and
contribute to, the information and biotechnology revolutions that
are now being thrust upon Africa (Maredia and Erbisch 1998).
Although there is much palaver in donor circles about capacity
building in Africa, many key players such as the CGIAR, NGOs,
and US and European universities have neither the mandate or the
resources to make an effective and sustainable contribution to
resolving Africa’s human capital degradation. This problem needs
to be addressed first and foremost by Africans during the next 25 to
50 years. The degradation of human capital in agriculture has
important implications for Africa’s future development prospects, as
well as for donors, international organizations, and universities in
industrial countries.
Yet increased donor aid is not the answer to Africa’s empty
harvest or to its human capital degradation. Over the past decade,
Africa has received US$ 64 billion of donor assistance to carry out
policy reforms, but the results have been disappointing (Collier
1997). A World Bank study, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t,
and Why (1998), recently concluded that the success of policy
reforms is crucially dependent upon “a good institutional
environment.” Before proceeding, it is important to define
institutions and organizations. Economic historian Douglass North,
who has long argued that a distinction must be made between
institutions and organizations (North 1990), defines institutions as
the rules (the legal system, financial regulations, and property
rights) that nurture, protect, and govern the operation of a market
economy. By contrast, organizations refer to universities, extension
services, and cooperatives that carry out specific missions in society.
4In his 1993 Nobel lecture in Stockholm, North argued that the field of
development economics was stalled because neoclassical economists
assumed away the importance of institutions and time (North 1998).
He contends that the major challenge facing poor nations in Africa,
Asia, and Eastern Europe is to develop the consistent and
transparent institutions that are essential for the effective
performance of organizations. The practical implication of North’s
argument is that organizations such as universities and extension
systems can expand and flourish with the inflow of donor support,
but they are likely to be unsustainable in countries that do not have
political leaders and farm organizations working together to create
and sustain “a good institutional environment.”
The nagging problem, however, is that the present knowledge
base on how to create a “good institutional environment” in African
nations is woefully inadequate. Likewise, the knowledge base on
how to craft effective demand-driven organizations to help poor
African farmers, traders, and the owners of micro-enterprises is
seriously lacking. In the balance of this paper, I shall focus on how to
strengthen the core organizations for a modern agriculture: national
agricultural research systems, national extension services, and
universities.
Since two-thirds of the people in Africa derive their livelihood
from agriculture, it follows that effective agricultural institutions are
a sine qua non for getting agriculture moving in Africa. But it is
difficult to secure financial support for designing and testing new
institutional models because of the “naive institutional optimism”
that pervades many donor agencies. This false optimism assumes
that African nations can import institutional models from other
continents (e.g., Grameen Bank, Green Revolution package
programs, the T&V extension model, and agricultural university
models from India and the USA), thereby short-circuiting the time-
consuming process of building indigenous institutions through a
trial and error and learning-by-doing process.
5Without question, the magnitude of the institution-building
task in Africa is more daunting than it was in India in the 1960s,
when three major international organizations helped that country
build a system of agricultural institutions.3 By contrast, in Zambia in
1996, there were 180 different agricultural projects being financed by
a dozen major donors. The challenge now is to merge, reshape, and
craft a coherent system of public and private agricultural support
institutions in Zambia and other African nations. Building effective
institutions is an onerous task because of the plethora of donors and
the thousands of NGOs that are awkwardly trying to make the
transition from their proven role in food relief to becoming effective
agents of agricultural development (White and Eicher 1999).
This lecture covers four topics: Afro-pessimism and what can
be learned from a similar wave of pessimism that blanketed Asia in
the 1960s; what has been learned about the causes of Africa’s empty
harvest; capacity building in agriculture with an emphasis on the
agricultural knowledge triangle that comprises three interlinked
institutions (teaching, research, and extension); and, in closing,
institutional challenges for debate and further study. Special
attention will be devoted to the sharp decline in the quality of
African university education, human capital degradation, and the
“meltdown” in the capacity of African universities to offer high-
quality graduate education. Unfortunately, this meltdown is
occurring at the same time that donors have “pulled the plug” on
scholarships that enable African agriculturalists to study overseas.
Afro-Pessimism: Lessons from Asia and Latin America
Afro-pessimism is flourishing in Africa today. It reflects the
sense of hopelessness that Africans feel about on-going civil wars,
corruption, urban violence, AIDS, and the limited success of foreign
3 The Ford Foundation helped India strengthen its national extension service; the Rockefeller
Foundation assisted with building research capacity and a graduate school for agriculture; and
USAID helped finance a network of state agricultural universities (Mellor 1976; Busch 1988).
6aid in improving the welfare of the average person. Today’s Afro-
pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of the 1960s
when Africa was a modest net exporter of food. At independence in
1960, the absence of a food crisis and the fervent belief in
industrialization help explain why many of Africa’s new leaders
shunned agriculture and announced bold plans to catch up with
industrial nations by the year 2000. This optimism was shared by
many economists. In 1967, the World Bank’s chief economist
identified seven African countries with “the potential to reach or
surpass” a 7% annual economic growth rate (Kamarck 1967). But
reality intervened and every one of the seven countries registered
negative per capita growth rates over the 1970–1988 period.
Yet Asia’s development experience reveals that a bleak
economic future for Africa in the twenty-first century is not
foreordained. There are scores of cracked crystal balls in economic
forecasting. Even Nobel Laureates such as Gunnar Myrdal can
widely miss the mark. Myrdal was pessimistic about Asia’s
development prospects in the late 1960s because of corruption, “soft
states,” rapid population growth, and the gloomy prospects for
agriculture. But Myrdal failed to anticipate Asia’s Green Revolution,
which was taking root at the same time that his book, Asian Drama,
was rolling off the press in 1968. The rapid spread of Green
Revolution wheat and rice varieties in Asia in the late 1960s and
early 1970s and China achieving the fastest rate of agricultural
growth in the world from 1980 to 1995 highlight the perils of
economic forecasting.
Myrdal was not the only economist who was pessimistic about
Asia’s development prospects in the 1950s and 1960s. In World Bank
reports in the 1950s, both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan were
considered to have poor development prospects. At Ghana’s
independence in 1957, Korea, Malaysia, and Ghana had the same
annual per capita income of around US$ 350. But Malaysia quickly
7displaced Nigeria as the world’s largest palm oil exporter and, today,
Malaysia’s R&D-driven oil palm industry is a strong competitor with
the USA and Brazil in the world edible oil markets (Jenkins and Lai
1992). In addition, Asian farmers today are routinely producing rice
for African palates. Senegal, for example, is importing around 1,000 t
of rice every day of the year, mainly from Vietnam, Thailand, and
Pakistan. China’s agricultural sector grew at an annual rate of 5.9%
during 1980–1990 (World Bank 1999), more than triple the 1.6%
average agricultural growth rate in the USA and Japan over the past
hundred years (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Although China is still a
poor country, with an average per capita income of around US$ 2.50
a day, it has increased family food security and banished famine. The
average male life expectancy in China is now 71 years, just six years
short of that in the USA (World Bank 1999). Finally, Bangladesh, long
considered a “basket case,” has recently emerged as an agricultural
success story (Ahmed, Haggblade, and Elahi, forthcoming). The
collective lesson Africa can draw from Asia’s agricultural
development experience is straightforward: The past is not a
blueprint for the future!
Latin America’s development experience also illustrates the
role time plays and the importance of viewing development as a
process of learning-by-doing. Most countries in Latin America have
been independent for more than 150 years. Brazil, for example,
became independent in 1822, some 138 years before Nigeria regained
its freedom in 1960. During its first hundred years of independence,
Brazil’s agricultural economy was typified by numerous coffee
booms and busts, but today it is bubbling with agricultural
innovations. Brazil has recently emerged as an agricultural
powerhouse and its farmers are formidable competitors with
American farmers in the global markets for soybean, frozen orange
juice, and chicken. Soil scientists have solved the aluminum toxicity
problem posed by the Cerrados soils in central Brazil, and local
farmers are producing an average of 7.8 t/ha of grain compared with
87.5 t/ha of maize in the US corn belt.4 Other Latin American
countries have also emerged as aggressive competitors in global food
markets. Chile’s booming exports of grapes, citrus, kiwi fruit, and
wine lend additional optimism to Latin America’s agricultural
development story. Who would have imagined back in the 1960s that
Brazil and Chile would have acquired the technical and managerial
capacity to go head to head with US agribusinesses in global food
markets? To summarize, the agricultural development experience of
Asia and Latin America counters the Afro-pessimism that
contaminates Africa.
Nevertheless, despite the poor track record of economic
forecasters, doomsday scenarios for Africa continue to be cranked
out by Western journalists. The celebrity peddler of Afro-pessimism
is Robert Kaplan, an American geopolitical travel specialist who
recently incorporated the findings of a two-month tour of West
Africa into a globally-based book, The Ends of the Earth (1996). A
reviewer concluded that “global books such as Kaplan’s are exercises
in selling fear more than understanding” (Gourevitch 1996).
To summarize, political and economic forecasts for developing
countries have proven to be far off the mark. Unfortunately, many
instant experts on Africa, such as Kaplan, are reinforcing Africa’s
sense of failure rather than shedding light on what Africans can do to
take charge of the development agenda and begin the ascent to a
better tomorrow.
Africa’s Empty Harvest in Historical Perspective
The vast, complex, and diverse continent of Africa defies easy
generalizations. But after 40 years of independence, five basic facts
emerge from Africa’s development experience:
4 Soil scientists discovered that the soils in central Brazil become depleted after 2–3 years of
continuous cultivation. But with the application of lime, phosphate fertilizer, and erosion
controls, the soils are highly productive (Sanchez et al. 1982).
9♦ Africa has an average annual per capita GNP of US$ 500
(World Bank 1999).
♦ Africa’s life expectancy is low, and it is falling in some
countries because of AIDS. Life expectancy is one decade less
than that of South Asia and almost two decades less than that
of China.
♦ Africa’s empty harvest has been dominated by two
interrelated food policy problems: short-term food
emergencies and a long-term food production gap.
♦ The volume of many of Africa’s traditional export crops has
fallen since the early 1970s, resulting in a decline in export
earnings, income, and employment for rural people.5
♦ Africa’s development crisis is far more than economic in
nature. The lack of political leadership, the dearth of farm
organizations, and the general absence of a “good
institutional environment” explain why the crisis will not
yield readily to economic prescriptions.
Africa’s empty harvest in both food and traditional export
crops should be examined together and in historical perspective.
Agricultural exports in the continent were buoyant in the 1950s and
1960s, but the volume of traditional agricultural exports declined
sharply in the 1970s. Beginning in 1973, Africa became a net food
importer. As we dig deeper, we find that virtually every African and
Western agricultural economist was slow to recognize that Africa’s
growing food imports in the 1970s represented the beginning of a
chronic food gap. This oversight was clouded by Africa’s land
abundance and a conviction that the 1968–1974 drought in the
Sahelian region of West Africa was a transitory event, rather than the
beginning of a decline in Africa’s long-term capacity to feed itself.
5 By 1988, Africa’s total export earnings were less than those of Singapore, a country of 2.5
million people (Summers 1988). If Africa had maintained its global share of nonpetroleum
exports, it would have generated an additional US$ 10 billion in revenue each year during the
1970s, an amount approaching its total annual foreign aid receipts during that period.
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Africa’s empty harvest was unambiguously identified as a chronic
problem in seminal reports by the FAO (1978) and the USDA (1981).
Both reports urged African governments to pursue a disciplined
strategy to increase food production over the long run. Nevertheless,
most African leaders failed to act on those two reports.6
The Honorable Tom Mboya, Kenya’s charismatic Minister of
Economic Planning, was a lonesome advocate for boosting food
production in the 1960s. In 1967, Mboya addressed the opening
meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa and argued:
A food programme for Africa must be intimately related to the needs of the
rest of the world. Our aim is not self-sufficiency; it is to become a major net
supplier to the rest of the world. No matter how successful our efforts are to
industrialize, it remains a fact that Africa will be for many generations,
primarily a producer of agricultural and other primary products. We must
learn to do it well and on a rapidly growing scale. This will require a
massive frontal attack, not only on the research needs to which I have
already referred, but also on the practical problems of production, storage,
and marketing” (Mboya 1967).
Africa’s food crises should be viewed in historical perspective.
The 1918 rice riots in Tokyo were caused by the same basic food
production shortfalls that India experienced in the mid-1960s, China
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Africa in the 1970s and 1980s.
The interesting question is: Why didn’t African leaders take steps to
meet the crisis? There are several explanations that taken together
may help us understand this conundrum. First, there was the fervent
belief among African political leaders that industrialization was the
expressway to prosperity and that food aid could help feed the cities
and address food emergencies. Second, the Cold War induced
dependency and rewarded predatory regimes, regardless of their
6 See the Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It that was prepared by a team of
American and Indian agricultural scientists under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation
(Government of India 1959).
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development priorities.7 Third, except in a few countries, there was
an absence of political power of farmers, which could present a
countervailing force to the prescribed development plans. In
countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, however,
large-scale commercial farmers were politically powerful and
effective in making the case for agriculture. Fourth, the delay in
facing up to Africa’s long-term food production crisis was linked to
the ready availability of food aid, a by-product of the subsidized
agricultural policies of the North in the 1970s and 1980s. Although
food aid can be praised for its role in addressing short-term food
emergencies, the ready availability of “food aid subscriptions”
delayed the day of reckoning.8
The fifth reason for the delay in implementing a long-run food
production strategy was the shift in donor assistance strategies in
Africa from economic growth and institution building in the 1960s to
the premature broadening of the development agenda in the 1970s.
World Bank President Robert McNamara led the charge to shift from
an economic growth paradigm to a broader development paradigm
in Africa. In his speech before the 1973 annual meeting of the World
Bank in Nairobi, McNamara (1973) committed the institution to
integrated rural development (IRD) to directly attack Africa’s rural
poverty and underdevelopment. Because of the World Bank’s
influence, most bilateral donors jumped on the bandwagon and
marshaled technical and financial resources to help Africans prepare
and implement IRD and area development projects. But in retrospect,
Africa’s adoption of the second generation agenda was premature
7 W. Arthur Lewis described the African leaders on the Cold War dole as the rogues of Africa:
Mobutu of Zaire, Banda of Malawi, and Kaunda of Zambia.
8 I recall a senior foreign aid official in Nairobi in the 1970s commenting that food aid (for
development) was a “plague across the continent” because it took the pressure off African
governments to reorder development priorities in favor of agriculture. Later at a SADC
meeting in Zambia in 1985, I recall a permanent secretary in a SADC Ministry of Agriculture
commenting that food aid had taken the pressure off the Ministry of Finance to increase the
budget of the Ministry of Agriculture.
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and the results fell as short as the “war” on rural poverty in the
United States in the 1960s.9
To summarize, the African response to its empty harvest in
food and export crops has been sporadic. But development is a
cumulative process that is built on a foundation of learning from
false starts, poisoned gifts, pilot projects, and occasional successes
(Hirschman 1967). Viewing development as a cumulative learning
experience entails sifting through the evidence in the hope that a
new generation of survivors has learned something from Africa’s
experience. Indeed, valuable insights have been gained about the
command system versus the market, agrarian capitalism and
socialism, the false dichotomy between food crops and cash crops,
the folly of developing industry in isolation from agriculture, and the
power of special interest groups in pressuring politicians in
industrial nations to broaden the development agenda (Stiglitz 1998).
By looking back 40 years, we have gleaned some insights that may be
helpful in understanding the causes of Africa’s empty harvest and
how to get African agriculture moving again. Essential to
understanding the situation are the intertwined phenomena of time
optimism10 and catching-up.
Time Optimism and Catching-Up
Africa’s 40 years of independence have been overlaid with an
understandable time optimism and a penchant to catching-up with
industrial nations in a few decades. The distinguished political
scientist Crawford Young recalls:
9 The IRD direct attack on rural poverty failed in the Appalachian region of the USA (during
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency), just as a similar program (community development) failed in
some 60 countries in Latin America and Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. See Holdcroft (1984) for
a discussion of the rise and fall of the community development thrust in the 1950s and
Binswanger (1998) for a discussion of the “painful lessons” derived from the IRD experience.
10 The term “time optimism” conveys the practice of understating the time that it will take to
achieve a given task such as building sustainable institutions in Africa.
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It’s difficult to recapture the sense of exhilaration that attended African
liberation at its high water mark in 1960, when no fewer than sixteen
states achieved independence. The crumbling of colonialism seemed but
prologue to other triumphs (Young 1982).
I recall the spirit of optimism in the early 1960s about
Nigeria’s prospects for becoming an industrial powerhouse by the
year 2000. This was a tall order, but it permeated planning circles
and foreign aid thinking and it helps explain why many of Africa’s
new leaders bet on industry as the vehicle to leapfrog over the
agrarian stage of development.
The time dimension has been a major issue in Africa’s
development debates, especially over the issue of the short- and the
long-run priorities for agriculture. Time was also a major issue in
Asian policy debates in the early 1960s when influential Asian
economists, Benjamin Higgins, and others argued that because
agriculture was a declining industry in the long run (in terms of the
percentage of the labor force employed and GDP), it was prudent
to give short-run priority to industrialization. But William H.
Nicholls (1964) argued that short-run policy attention should be
given to agriculture to avert a subsequent food bottleneck and a
chain reaction of higher food prices, higher wages, and reduced
industrial profits.
One of the most important tasks for agricultural economists is
to convince ministries of finance to invest some of the taxes
collected from farmers back into rural infrastructure and basic
agricultural institutions in the short run in order to enhance the
productivity of agriculture in the medium to long term. Few
agricultural economists in Africa have won this argument, partially
because of the ready availability of food aid subscriptions. Also, in
dual agrarian societies such as South Africa, large-scale farms have
helped ensure a reliable food surplus, thus taking the pressure off
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the ruling party and the Ministry of Finance to address the needs of
the country’s 10 million communal farms and the rural poor (Eicher
and Rukuni 1996).11
The belief that a poor nation can catch up through an “industrial
spurt” has undermined the case for a disciplined, long-term approach
to building rural infrastructure and the scientific capacity for a
modern agriculture. Five examples illustrate the time optimism and
penchant for instant development:
♦ The distinguished Ghanaian economist Robert Gardiner (who
later became the head of the UN Economic Commission for
Africa) captured the catch-up mood of many African
intellectuals and politicians during the 1960s when he noted
that: “Given the variety of raw materials and their quality and
the potential resources of energy and power with which the
continent is endowed, there is no reason why the present level
of development in Western Europe should not be attained by
Africa by the beginning of the next century” (Gardiner 1968).
♦ At a political rally in Senegal in 1969, President Senghor
launched what he called the “Mystique of the Year 2000” and
articulated a “vision of a modern and prosperous Senegal in
the year 2000, a Senegal that by then would have tripled its per
capita income and entered the ranks of the world’s
industrialized nations” (Gellar 1982).
♦ Philip Ndegwa, the late governor of the Central Bank of Kenya,
summed up the urgency of getting on with development by
noting that Africa is “desperately short of time” (Ndegwa
1987).
♦ The influential 1981 World Bank report Accelerated Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa (the Berg report), which made the
intellectual case for structural adjustment and policy reforms,
11 See Carter and May (1999) for an analysis of rural poverty in South Africa and the policies
that are needed to lift the constraints that limit the effective use of the assets (land and labor)
of the poor.
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concluded with this note of optimism: “policy action and
foreign assistance that are mutually reinforcing will surely work
together to build a continent that shows real gains in both
development and income in the near future” (World Bank 1981).
♦ Former World Bank Vice President for Africa Edward V. K.
Jaycox reported that if we “focus on capacity building per se, not
take it for granted that the capacity is there, we can make a
tremendous difference in a very short time in Africa”
(Jaycox 1993).
These examples of time optimism illustrate why it is important to
inject the time dimension into the analysis of capacity building.
Because of time optimism it is easy to downplay the time and resources
that will be required for building scientific and managerial capacity
and moving low-income nations in Africa into the ranks of middle-
income countries. Surely it is a challenge for the coming 25 to 50 years.
After all, it took Michigan State University 70 years (1855–1925) to
develop the capacity to produce its first PhD!
Industrial Fundamentalism and State-Led Agriculture
Peter Timmer (1998) and Yujiro Hayami (1998) have reminded us
that three of the most strategic development questions for new nations
to resolve are as follows:
♦ Should industrialization be promoted in isolation from village
agriculture and rural industries or as a complementary activity
that promotes agriculture-industry and rural-urban growth
linkages?
♦ Should priority be given to investing public revenues from taxes
on farmers back into agriculture (e.g., roads, schools, research)
or into the industrial sector?
♦ Should agricultural production be carried out by small-scale
private farms or by state-led production schemes such as
government plantations, farm settlements, state farms, and
ujamaa (communal) farming schemes?
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Most new nations answered these questions by pursuing
industrialization and state-led agricultural production schemes. A
large share of the public revenue from marketing board taxes on
farmers was invested in industrial projects (e.g., cement and textile
plants) and large-scale agricultural schemes, many of which were
inherited from the colonial powers. The Cameroon Development
Corporation (CDC) is a good example and it illustrates the concept of
path-dependence in action.12 The CDC was created in 1946 as a
statutory corporation to take over and administer the plantations
confiscated from the Germans in 1939. At independence in 1960, the
new Cameroonian government nationalized the CDC and operated
its plantations as a parastatal (government corporation). But the CDC
has been a money-losing white elephant. Today it has a labor force of
13,000 and 100,000 ha of land; which includes 11 rubber plantations,
seven oil palm plantations, three tea plantations, and two banana
plantations. Because the CDC complex has been a drain on the
treasury, the government put the entire complex on the international
auction block in early 1999.
Path-dependence also comes into play in devising schemes to
tax farmers. At independence, many of Africa’s new governments
continued using the colonial-style marketing boards to tax export
crops produced by smallholders. Much of the public revenue from
the government marketing boards was invested in state-led
agricultural schemes that politicians sprinkled across the landscape.
For example, soon after independence in 1961, the government of
Sierra Leone established one state farm for each of the country’s 13
regions as a means to what one politician described to me as
“bringing development to the people.” Also, at independence many
new governments maintained colonial agricultural policies that
12 Path-dependence is a concept used by economic historians to illustrate how development
options are influenced by past events. Examples of path-dependence include the continuation of
colonial marketing boards, liberal arts style universities, and the dual agrarian structure (large-
scale and small-scale farms) in southern Africa.
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conferred tax benefits to large-scale commercial farmers in countries
such as Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Malawi.13
Africa’s empty harvest is partially attributed to the gamble at
independence to give priority to building modern industrial plants
in isolation from the concurrent modernization of village agriculture
and village industries (Hayami 1998). Basically, the decision of
Africa’s new nations to invest public revenues from agricultural
taxes into state-run steel mills and plantations (instead of public
goods such as rural roads and agricultural colleges to help small-
scale farms) represented a pursuit of Karl Marx’s belief in
mechanized farming and the replication of Stalin’s priority for
industry.14 But the decision of Africa’s new leaders to invest in
industry in isolation from village agriculture and rural industries
was also consonant with the views of many Western development
economists in the 1950s, who assumed that agriculture was a passive
sector, a black box that could be squeezed to finance industry. The
author of a leading development economics textbook of the 1950s,
for example, asserted that “agriculture stands convicted” for its
inability to stimulate economic growth in other sectors of a nation’s
economy (Hirschman 1958). Today, development textbooks
emphasize the importance of promoting agricultural and industrial
linkages, increasing rural non-farm incomes, and building rural and
urban linkages in an era of globalization.15
13 See Deininger and Binswanger (1995) for a detailed examination of rent-seeking and the tax
benefits given to large-scale farms in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.
14 The industrial fundamentalism that blanketed Asia in the 1950s and Africa in the 1960s was
partially based on the hope of replicating Stalin’s heavy industry model, which converted the
Soviet Union into the world’s second industrial power in two decades (1930–1950). India
borrowed the concept of central planning and industrialization from the Soviets in the 1950s.
India, however, abandoned the Soviet heavy industry model in the mid-1960s and gave
priority to addressing its food crisis. Likewise, after a decade of experimentation, China
discarded the Soviet heavy industry model in 1970 and shifted to a balanced industry/
agricultural development strategy followed by the abandonment of communal farming in 1978
and the introduction of the household responsibility system (Lin 1998).
15 See Reardon et al. (1998) and Hayami (1998).
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Regrettably, the decision of many new nations to give priority
to industry over agriculture during the past 40 years of independence
has yielded a number of false starts in an agrarian-dominated
continent. The experiences of Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Senegal
illustrate the folly of giving priority to industry and state-led
agricultural production and processing projects. Let us start with
Ghana, the most economically advanced country in Africa (excluding
South Africa) at independence in 1957.
Ghana
Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the interim government during
Ghana’s drive for independence in the early 1950s, invited W. Arthur
Lewis to develop a strategy to guide the government in its drive to
become a modern industrial nation by the year 2000. Lewis, who
later went on to win the Nobel prize in economics, surprised
Nkrumah by stressing in his Report on Industrialization in the Gold
Coast16 that Ghana should give priority to increasing food
production, not industrialization (Lewis 1953). Lewis argued that an
industry-first strategy would be undermined by food shortages and
rising food prices, which would raise wage rates and eventually slow
the rate of growth of industrial production.
Nkrumah ignored Lewis’ recommendation and Ghana gave
priority to industrialization and harnessing the hydropower of the
Volta River to provide cheap electric power for an aluminum bauxite
industry. Turning to farming, Nkrumah abolished the national
agricultural extension service that served small-scale farms because
of his conviction that private small-scale farms were “an obstacle to
the spread of socialist ideas” (Killick 1978). Nkrumah promoted state
farms because of his belief in the Marxist view of the presumed
economies of scale of large-scale plantations and mechanized
farming (Nweke 1978).
16 The Gold Cost was renamed Ghana at independence.
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But Nkrumah’s industry and state farm model of development
failed to generate a reliable food surplus and transform Ghana into a
modern industrial nation.17 After 10 years in office, Nkrumah was
overthrown while on a visit to China. After Nkrumah was toppled,
Ghana experienced a wave of coups d’etat in the 1970s and is now on
the road to economic recovery.
Tanzania
Tanzania’s love affair with industrialization is equally
instructive because after the nation gained independence in 1961,
President Julius Nyerere made impassioned speeches about reducing
urban-rural income disparities by giving priority to farmers and
rural communities. Under Nyerere’s leadership, however, the
government abolished the Ministry of Local Government and the
Ministry of Cooperatives and forced farmers to give up their private
farms and move into ujamaa villages that were modeled after
Chinese communal farms. The government used cotton and coffee
tax revenues to help finance the establishment of some 400 state-
owned companies, including textile and bicycle factories18 and an ill-
fated pulp and paper factory that was built with technical expertise
from Finland (Lipumba 1984). When the government paid small-
scale coffee farmers 23% of the world price of coffee (Tweeten 1989),
farmers responded to this economic extortion by smuggling coffee
and other crops across Tanzania’s porous national borders. Although
Nyerere is praised for his honesty, his leadership in fostering ethnic
harmony, and his voluntary decision to step down from the
17 I escorted a group of Nigerian graduate students to Ghana a few weeks after Nkrumah was
overthrown in 1967. The students were eager to inspect the achievements of the fiery Pan
African leader. But when we arrived in the capital city of Accra, the students were stunned to
see Ghanaians lined up at shops for food aid handouts. The Nigerian students had a hard time
reconciling their distant admiration for Nkrumah with the reality that Ghana’s economy, as
Arthur Lewis predicted back in 1953, was undermined by food shortages.
18 In the mid-1980s, I recall the funeral-like atmosphere hanging over the idle, Indian-built bicycle
factory on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam and the state-owned shoe factory in Morogoro that
was running at only 4% of capacity.
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presidency, one cannot overlook the grim reality that after receiving
billions of dollars of foreign aid, Tanzania is the sixth poorest country
in the world (World Bank 1999). Tanzania’s economic stagnation is a
textbook case of the failure of state-led industrialization and
communal farming, and it illustrates how draconian rates of taxation
on farmers can spawn a massive smuggling operation across
national borders.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s experience with industrialization represents another
painful false start. At independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited an
economy that was a net exporter of both food and export crops.
Thanks to international investments in petroleum exploration that
started in the 1930s, petroleum exports took off in the 1970s and soon
dwarfed agricultural exports as the major source of foreign exchange
earnings.19 Awash with foreign exchange earnings from petroleum,
Nigeria maintained an overvalued exchange rate that encouraged
food imports and undermined incentives for farmers producing
agricultural exports such as cocoa, oil palm, and groundnuts. From
1970 to 1995, Nigeria squandered an estimated US$ 110 billion of
petroleum revenues on a plethora of large-scale projects, including a
US$ 3.5 billion state-owned iron and steel complex and numerous ill-
fated irrigation schemes in the northern part of the country.
Undermined by political instability, corruption, and
mismanagement, the Nigerian economy imploded in the 1980s.
Today, Nigeria has neither modern industry or productive
agriculture.
19 At the beginning of the oil boom in the early 1970s, I recall hearing Nigerian intellectuals
argue that Nigeria was poised to become an industrial giant, i.e., the Brazil of Africa, and
that Nigeria would be exporting VW automobiles and armaments to other African
countries in the 1980s.
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Senegal
When Senegal won its independence from France in 1960,
President Leopold Senghor announced grandiose plans for Senegal
to become an industrial society through “state initiative and
planning, economic specialization, and industrialization” (Vaillant
1990). In the 1960s, the government followed the advice of French
advisors and developed infrastructure to support new industries,
continued the production of its main export crop (peanuts), and
maintained close trade ties with France (Gellar 1995). In the 1970s,
the government tried to diversify its agricultural sector away from
peanuts and develop three engines of growth: tourism, ocean fishing,
and phosphate exports. Abdou Diouf assumed the presidency in
1981 and pursued Senghor’s dream of achieving an industrial take-
off. In a radio interview in 1990, Diouf looked ahead to the year 2000
and commented:
I want Senegal to have finally taken off economically once and for all; I
want us to have jump-started the economy in a healthy, energetic, and
vigorous way. Once this economic take-off has occurred, I want the country
to reach its cruising altitude and cruising speed quickly, taking giant
strides toward the status of a semi-industrial, and then industrial, society
(Diouf 1990).
But the pro-industry policies of Senghor and Diouf failed to
jump-start the economy and the dreams of transforming Senegal into
an industrial nation remain unfulfilled.
Africans’ dreams of becoming instant industrial nations have
been overtaken by reality. Nevertheless, despite repeated failures, the
dreams of industrialization have great staying power. Even though
Africa’s population was growing at double the rate of food
production throughout the 1970s, the political arm of African
governments, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), lobbied the
United Nations to declare the 1980s as the Industrial Development
Decade for Africa (Hawkins 1986). It seems fair to ask why African
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leaders pressed on with industrialization in the 1980s at a time when
a million people died in the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1985.20
These four case studies illustrate the unrealized dream of
leapfroging over the agrarian stage of development to become
modern industrial powers in a single generation. To be sure,
industrial output in Africa grew at an annual rate of 10% from 1955
to 1965 (Rweyemamu 1980). However, the rate of growth slowed
considerably in the 1970s and by 1980, because of high investment
costs, mismanagement, and a lack of basic infrastructure, industrial
production costs were 30–300% higher in Africa than in Asia
(Rweyemamu 1980).
The central insight that flows from these case studies is that
after 40 years of independence, most African leaders are not
assigning high priority to the first generation problem of getting
agriculture moving (Mellor 1998a). Moreover, most policy reform
packages are ineffective in addressing the critical issue of “political
and institutional failure.” Although many African governments
accepted aid-for-policy-reform packages from donors during the past
10 to 15 years, it has been relatively easy to renege on the agreed-
upon reforms. For example, “during a fifteen-year period, Kenya sold
the same agricultural reform to the World Bank four times, each time
reversing it after receipt of the aid” (Collier 1997). The political and
geopolitical strategic location of Kenya helps explain why many
donors tolerate this type of duplicity.
20 The starry-eyed belief in industrialization and mechanized state farms as the motor of
development was reinforced by a widespread view among politicians and development
economists that small-scale family farms could neither be made profitable on a recurring basis
or be counted on to generate a reliable food surplus to provision the cities. In short, the
industrial fundamentalism that permeated Western, Soviet, and African thinking in the 1950s
and 1960s was based on a false dichotomy: industry versus agriculture. Both industry and
agriculture need each other for raw materials, inputs, and markets. Industry must serve
agriculture because farmers are a major market for industrial products and consumer goods in
countries where 60–90% of the population are involved with agriculture. The crucial balance
between industry and agriculture in any one country in Africa will depend on the nation’s
stage of economic history, population-land ratios, and other related factors.
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But there are hopeful signs on the horizon. Mali may be
considered a case study of a country where agriculture is moving.
The military regime was overthrown in 1991 and President Konare
took over and promoted democratization, a free press, and the
growth of farmer organizations.21 A recent paper, “Cotton,
Democracy, and Development,” traces the emergence of the now-
powerful cotton growers association back to 1974, when an extension
agent helped local farmers organize a protest against dishonest
cotton grading and weighing practices (Bingen 1998). Responding to
farmers’ demands, the cotton authority “gradually transferred
responsibility for cotton grading and weighing, equipment and
supply orders and credit management to village groups.” Mali’s case
study reveals how a poor nation can develop grassroots farmer
organizations over a period of decades, provided there is
enlightened and supportive leadership in the statehouse. Today,
cotton and rice production and horticultural exports are flourishing
(Tefft, Staatz, and Dione 1997). Mali’s economic success and Kenya’s
decline in the 1990s can fundamentally be traced to who has been in
the statehouse: Konare or Moi?22
There are also seeds of hope in the Sahelian region of West
Africa. One observer reports that 25 years after the devastating
drought, “most of the countries in the region can claim to have
decisively put the threat of famine behind them, making great strides
in food production, transport, and marketing” (van de Walle 1998).
But the Sahelian region remains extremely dependent on foreign aid.
Additional seeds of hope include the introduction of improved
cassava varieties in West Africa (Nweke, forthcoming) and the
widespread diffusion of hybrid maize in eastern and southern Africa
(Byerlee and Eicher 1997) and more recently in Ethiopia. There are
also seeds of hope on the agricultural export front. After the 1994
21 President Konare has a PhD in archeology.
22 It is still too early to determine whether Mali will join Botswana as an African success story.
Much depends on whether the opposition party will emerge as a stronger force and whether
President Konare honors the constitution and steps down after two terms in office.
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CFA franc devaluation, cotton production expanded in every
Francophone country in West Africa except Senegal. Cotton
production has also increased in Mozambique. Success stories in non-
traditional export commodities include paprika from Zimbabwe, an
array of spices from Madagascar, and cut flowers from Kenya.
But success stories are not the product of a mere decade of toil.
Effort must be sustained over a period of decades and this requires
extraordinary political leadership. For example, in some countries the
seeds of hope of one decade have quickly been squandered in the
next decade. Zimbabwe is a classic case of success followed by
failure. After independence in 1980, President Mugabe helped level
the playing field for smallholder farmers and they responded by
doubling maize production between 1980 and 1986 (Eicher and
Kupfuma 1998). But Mugabe lost interest in agriculture in the 1990s
as he toyed with the land distribution question, pursued erratic
macroeconomic policies, and most recently sent his soldiers and gem
hunters into the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire).
Despite Mali’s promise and the maize, cassava, and cotton
success stories that I have cited, I am still of the conviction that most
governments in Africa are treating long-term agricultural
development as a secondary activity. There are only a few countries
in Africa today where there is political commitment to mount and
sustain a disciplined long-term effort to increase broad-based
agricultural growth.
Getting Agriculture Moving Again
Turning to the future, it is important that agriculture is called
upon to do more than feed Africa’s growing population. For if we
call on agriculture solely for increased food production, we would be
selling agriculture short. Long-term investments must be made in the
agricultural sector to feed a growing population, generate jobs for a
growing rural labor force, generate foreign exchange through the sale
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of traditional and non-traditional exports, serve as a market for
industrial products, and contribute to rural and urban poverty
alleviation by driving down the real (inflation-adjusted) cost of food
over time (Johnston and Mellor 1961). These multiple challenges for
the agricultural sector explain why agriculture is entitled to a large
claim on public resources in order to build roads, research stations,
colleges of agriculture, and other essential components of a modern,
science-based agriculture. This is precisely what happened in the
United States from 1860 to the 1920s, a 60-year span during which
the government built roads, schools, and a free rural mail-delivery
system, as well as colleges of agriculture and a national network of
more than 400 agricultural research stations and sub-stations
(Galbraith 1985). But this six-decade time frame is at sharp variance
with the time horizons of most African leaders and foreign aid
officials. The desire for quick fixes is epitomized by the case of an
American ambassador in an African country who directed his foreign
aid chief in the early 1980s to design projects that would generate
“high visibility and quick returns.” This predilection for the quick fix
is simply a manifestation of the current political mandate in
industrial countries to achieve people-level impacts in Africa as soon
as possible.
Many African leaders are still postponing the day of reckoning,
when it will be necessary to face up to the long-term food gap and
the loss of export markets, and to make the hard political choices and
investments required to develop a modern agriculture. India faced a
similar crisis in the early 1960s and after several years of intense
debates, the government made a fundamental political decision to
launch an all-out campaign to become self-sufficient in food, a goal
that it reached 16 years later in 1981.
Much has been learned in Asia during the past 40 years about
the catalytic roles that agriculture can play in the development
process. A large global knowledge base is now available on what is
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required to mobilize agriculture as a major contributor to breaking the
cycle of poverty, hunger, and famine.23 This information can be used, in
turn, to mobilize the hidden creativity and unexploited potential of
Africa’s 50 million farm families as an engine of agricultural growth.
We now turn to the difficult task of figuring out how to develop
effective and sustainable agricultural institutions.
Institutional Expansion, Downsizing, and Restructuring
Africa’s post-independence agrarian history has been dominated
by two distinct phases of institutional expansion and reform. The first,
from 1960 to 1985, can be described as a public sector expansion phase
par excellence—it was consonant with the state-led development
paradigm of the day. The second, from 1985 to 1999, can be described
as a period of downsizing public universities and research and
extension services, privatizing parastatals, and encouraging foreign
private investments and new forms of public/private partnerships.
The Expansion Phase: 1960 to 1985
At independence, virtually every new government launched
massive public sector initiatives to mobilize, educate, and nurture the
potential human capital that had been buried under seven colonial
regimes. The scope of this human capital renaissance was daunting. At
independence, Botswana had only 40 university graduates. In 1960,
90% of the agricultural researchers in Africa were expatriates.24 To
Africanize the civil service, new governments dramatically increased
primary and secondary school enrollment, constructed new
universities, and sent thousands of students abroad for BSc and
graduate level training. Donors responded admirably to the human
capital challenge by helping to finance the construction of new
universities, upgrading diploma level schools of agriculture into
23 See Johnston and Mellor (1961); Schultz (1964); Eicher and Baker (1982); Lele (1991); Martin
(1992); Idachaba (1995); Eicher and Staatz (1998); Rukuni (1994); Mrema (1997); Hayami
(1997); Delgado (1998); Rusike (1998); and Reardon et al. (1998).
24 By contrast, at India’s independence in 1947, almost all research scientists were Indian.
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faculties of agriculture, and converting faculties of agriculture into
agricultural universities.
The achievements of the first generation of human capital
development are impressive:
♦ The number of extension workers in sub-Saharan Africa
increased from 21,000 in 1959 to 57,000 in 1980 (Judd, Boyce,
and Evenson 1986).
♦ The number of universities increased from around 20 in 1960
to 160 in 1996 (Beintema, Pardey, and Roseboom 1998).
♦ The number of full-time equivalent agricultural scientists
increased from around 2,000 in 1960 to 9,000 in 1991 (Pardey,
Roseboom, and Beintema 1997). In many countries, the
number of scientists increased five- to tenfold. In Nigeria, the
number of agricultural scientists increased from 100 in 1960 to
1,000 in 1985.25
The Downsizing and Restructuring Phase
The overexpansion of many public organizations serving
agriculture from 1960 to 1985 was followed by a period of
retrenchment and restructuring from 1985 to the present. Structural
adjustment loans typically included agreed-upon conditions
(conditionality) to reduce the size of the civil service and research
and extension services, privatize parastatals, and promote private
enterprise.26 The three core institutions in the agricultural knowledge
triangle—research, extension, and higher education—have been
downsized and restructured, and new private institutions (seed and
25 To be sure, there is substantial variation among the 48 countries in terms of the timing, speed,
and scope of the increase in the size of public agricultural services such as research and
extension. Anglophone countries made the most rapid progress in replacing colonial scientists
and civil servants. The Francophone countries lagged because many new governments invited
the French to continue to manage their national research institutes for 10–15 years after
independence. Lusophone countries were latecomers because Mozambique and Angola did not
win their independence until 1975.
26 In the early 1990s, many donors pressed African governments to go beyond these reforms and
tackle corruption and promote decentralization, participation, and democratization.
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fertilizer companies, universities, etc.) are now in stiff competition
with their public counterparts. Following are highlights for the key
players in this downsizing phase.
Agricultural Extension
Most public agricultural extension services in Africa are now in
crisis because of their ineffective performance and their inability to
underwrite the quantum growth of most national extension services.
The T&V extension model has also come under attack because it has
been found to be fiscally unsustainable. The crisis in extension has
helped fuel the search for a diversity of approaches, including
increased participation of the private sector and NGOs.27
Unfortunately, there is little rigorous research on the cost-
effectiveness of alternative extension models.
Agricultural Research
The rapid expansion in the number of agricultural researchers
in the 1960s and 1970s was challenged in the 1980s because many
public research systems were found to be unproductive and heavily
dependent on foreign aid (Pardey, Roseboom, and Beintema 1997).
Because of these problems, many national agricultural research
systems (NARS) are now being downsized. The Kenya Agricultural
Research Institute (KARI) is overstaffed and is now being downsized
(staff rationalization) with the assistance of a US$ 10 million grant
from the European Union. Agricultural research is now moving in
the same direction as extension, and a search is underway for a wide
range of public and private models that are demand-driven and
fiscally sustainable (Rukuni, Blackie, and Eicher 1998).
Agricultural Higher Education
Since the mid-1980s, universities have suffered a sharp cut in
real budgets, a decline in the quality of the educational experience,
27 For a discussion of alternative extension models for the twenty-first century, see Antholt
(1998). For a discussion of the evolution of the T&V system see Venkatesan and Kampen
(1998). See Bauer, Hoffman, and Keller (1998) for a stinging critique of the T&V model.
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and a brain drain.28 Many faculties of agriculture that were launched
in the 1960s and 1970s have carried out ambitious academic staff
development programs. As a result, in many countries there are
more Africans with PhDs in faculties of agriculture than in the public
agricultural research institutes. This explains why several observers
have recommended ways to increase the contribution of universities
to the research program of NARS (Byerlee and Alex 1998).
Four insights can be derived from this review of agricultural
institutions that will be of help in the third phase of institutional
change—crafting demand-driven and fiscally sustainable public and
private institutions and NGOs. First, because of the immensity,
diversity, and complexity of Africa, and the path-dependence that is
embodied in its seven colonial heritages,29 it is foolhardy to assume
that a single university or research or extension model will be
effective throughout Africa. Peter Timmer illustrates the complexity
of African agriculture by recalling his first visit to Kenya.
Rice is a whole lot easier technologically. I can drive from Jakarta to
Krawang, the rice bowl of West Java. It’s 60 miles, 70 miles, out and back,
and it’s rice fields. And it’s one variety or another, but it’s rice all the way
out. Come back a different road and it’s rice all the way back. I haven’t been
in Africa much, but the one time I was in Kenya, I remember driving up
one hill and down the next and seeing 12 different agroclimatic zones and
12 different cropping pattens, and 50 different crops. I couldn’t believe the
complexity of the farming systems as they varied up and down the hills
(Timmer 1991).
Timmer’s observation reinforces the point that the complexity
of African diets demands more location-specific research on
cropping systems than is required in the rice bowl of Asia.
28 For a discussion of the decline in the quality of the university experience, see Coleman and
Court (1993); Ajayi et al. (1996); and Willett (1998). For a discussion of building scientific
capacity in agriculture, see McKelvey (1965); Odhiambo (1989); Beintema, Pardey, and
Roseboom (1998); Eicher (1990); Jones and Blackie (1991); Lele (1991); Lynam and Blackie
(1994); and World Bank (1992).
29 French, English, Spanish, German, Belgian, Portugese, and Italian.
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The second insight is that most African nations are at an earlier
stage of scientific and institutional development than India was on
the eve of the Green Revolution in the mid-1960s. This proposition
challenges the prevailing time optimism and reinforces the need to
pay careful attention to the time and resources required to
accomplish the task of strengthening the human capital base and the
institutional foundation.30
Third, imported institutions from other cultures and other
continents will undoubtedly have a high failure rate in Africa if they
are replicated before the satisfactory completion of a pilot phase. The
T&V extension model is an example of replicating an imported
model in several dozen African countries before it was thoroughly
tested. But testing and modifying imported models requires public
and foundation resources to finance pilot projects and independent
evaluation teams that have the freedom to collect benchmark data
and evaluate the performance of alternative organizational models.31
The slow and patient development of the Grameen model of micro-
credit is a good example of how action research and pilot projects
were used to develop a new type of credit organization (the
Grameen Bank) before it was replicated on a national scale. After
Professor Mohamed Yunus completed his graduate study in
economics in the United States, he joined a university in northern
Bangladesh and set up an action research project to find out if the
poor were bankable, i.e., would they repay small loans. He secured
financial support from the Ford Foundation and later from IFAD to
implement action research from 1976 to 1979 in villages surrounding
30 See Lele and Goldsmith (1989) for an insightful analysis of India’s strategy of building
scientific capacity in agriculture.
31 If we turn back the clock to the colonial period, we note that before the large Gezira irrigation
scheme was launched in the Sudan, researchers carried out pilot agronomic projects for 13 years
before the water was turned on (Milligan and Hapgood 1967). Likewise, before a cotton research
station was established in Uganda, British colonial officers spent five years studying local farm
practices for use in designing on-station trials (Arnold 1976). By contrast, in Senegal, two
large dams were built in the 1970s, far ahead of local agronomic research on crop rotation and
anthropological research on how to organize farmers, i.e., individually, collectively, etc.
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his university, followed by a pilot phase from 1979 to 1982. In 1982,
he decided that he had enough information to replicate his Grameen
(village) micro-credit model throughout Bangladesh (Robinson 1998).
Much energy has also been wasted in trying to replicate Asia’s
Green Revolution model in Africa before the completion of pilot
studies. Over the past decade, many instant experts on Africa have
talked glibly about the ease of replicating Asia’s Green Revolution
model in Africa. Many of these experts have overlooked Africa’s
early stage of scientific development, falsely assuming that Africa
had the requisite infrastructure,32 irrigated land, trained scientists,
technology, and national and local institutions to replicate the
Asian model.33
Fourth, there are numerous design flaws in donor-financed,
supply-driven models of institution building (Ruttan 1982; Eicher
1982; and Tendler 1997). Notable among these flaws is the priority
given to front-loading research, extension, and education projects
with new buildings, vehicles, and overseas training in order to
achieve visible progress in four to five years, the time frame that
most donors need to justify the preparation of a second five-year
phase. The repetition of this cycle often leads to a large staff, a
magnificent set of buildings, limited scientific capacity, and a bloated
and fiscally unsustainable institution. Also, the supply side approach
that is supported by foreign aid allows local administrators (deans of
agriculture and directors of NARSs and extension services) to
postpone the day of reckoning, i.e., the need to focus on the demand
side and generate political and financial support from farm
organizations, commodity groups, and agribusiness firms. Finally,
the supply-driven model often ignores the research needs of local
and national groups of farmers, traders, and agribusiness and
32 See Spencer and Badiane (1995) for a comparative assessment of rural road density in
Africa and Asia.
33 See my early reservations about the Sasakawa-Global 2000 initiative to increase food
production in Africa (Eicher 1988).
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underinvests in the marketing and trade research required to ferret
out global trade opportunities. Because of these design flaws,
attention has now shifted to crafting demand-driven models.
To be sure, much has been accomplished during the
downsizing and restructuring of extension, research, and higher
education over the past 15 years, but there is a paucity of research on
the performance of these restructured institutions. For example, there
are numerous studies showing that NGOs can increase grassroots
participation in extension programs, but there is no study in Africa to
date on the cost and benefits of achieving these higher rates of
participation (White and Eicher 1999).
Crafting Demand-Driven Agricultural
Knowledge Triangles: Bread-and-Butter Issues
We now turn to some bread-and-butter issues34 in reforming
and strengthening the three core institutions that make up the
agricultural knowledge triangle:
research, extension, and agricultural
higher education. In most countries,
universities are the weak link in the
triangle, partially because they are in
their infancy. Figure 1 shows that
most faculties of agriculture in Africa
were established during the past 20
to 30 years. Crafting agricultural
knowledge triangles is complicated
by the fact that Africa is littered with
donor-financed development
projects, including 2,740 in
34 I am borrowing this phrase from Derek Byerlee’s
influential article “Bread and Butter Issues in
Ecuadorian Food Policy” (1989).
Figure 1. Establishment dates of
universities with a faculty of
agriculture or veterinary sciences
in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Tanzania alone (Jaycox 1997).35 Because of the well-known flaws in
the project approach to institution building, let us turn to the
agricultural knowledge triangle as a way of integrating research,
extension, and education activities and ensuring the sequential
continuity of investments in these core institutions.
The Agricultural Knowledge Triangle
Over the past 10 to 15 years, there has been an on-going debate
about the need to move beyond the project-by-project approach to a
systems approach to coordinate and sequence interlinked
investments in agricultural research, extension, and education.36
Various scholars have articulated this approach under the following
rubrics: agricultural knowledge system, agricultural knowledge
information system (AKIS), and what I call the agricultural
knowledge triangle.37 Basically, these approaches argue that public
and private managers of separately governed institutions should
come together and “coordinate” decisions on the size and sequencing
of complementary investments, because the payoff has been found to
be higher if they are planned and executed as a joint activity rather
than pursued as freestanding extension, research, or education
projects (Evenson, Waggoner, and Ruttan 1979; Bonnen 1998;
Boughton et al. 1995).
Despite the high returns to projects that integrate research,
extension, and education, African governments and donors, for
many reasons, have usually prepared separate projects for each of
35 See Morss (1984) for an early statement on the negative impact of the proliferation of donors
and projects on the major institutions in Africa.
36 See Roling (1988) for a discussion of this evolution. For an update on Wageningen
University’s adoption of a knowledge system approach see Roseboom and Rutten (1998).
37 Examples include a USAID plan to strengthen agricultural research and faculties of
agriculture (USAID 1985); ISNAR’s report on strengthening linkages between research and
farmers’ organizations (Eponou 1996); ISNAR’s recent study of linkages between universities
and NARSs in Africa (Michelsen and Shapiro 1998); and the World Bank’s Agricultural
Research and Training Project in Uganda. For a synthesis of the evolution of the World Bank’s
support for agricultural services (mainly extension and research) in Africa see Venkatesan and
Kampen (1998).
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these activities. First, colonial export crop research stations were
established in many countries between 1900 and 1920, followed by a
time lag of 50 to 70 years before faculties of agriculture and
veterinary science were established. This historical head start and
studies showing high rates of return to research help explain why
agricultural research institutes have often received generous donor
support. Second, research and extension activities are often included
in the same project because both organizations are often
administratively housed in the ministry of agriculture. Third, joint
research, extension, and higher education projects are difficult to
coordinate and implement because the administrators of universities,
extension, and research services typically report to different
ministries. Fourth, it is well-known that projects that integrate
research, extension, and higher education, as typified by the US land
grant model and the state (Indian) agricultural university model,
have not performed well in Africa.38 Lastly, the bureaucracies of
donor and international organizations present their own constraints.
An extension specialist describes the bureaucratic difficulties in
preparing and implementing joint research, extension, and
agricultural higher education projects in the World Bank:
The Bank’s involvement with the development of higher agricultural
education at the university level in Africa has been minimal. . . . Within
the Bank, the Agriculture Divisions have no responsibility for
universities, which are the responsibility of the Education Divisions. . . .
It is not therefore surprising that the Bank projects in extension and
research do not provide support to higher agricultural education
(Venkatesan 1991).
What has been the result of sprinkling separate extension,
research, and higher education projects across the African landscape?
Has this approach resulted in an underinvestment in one of the three
38 See Johnson and Okigbo (1989) for a critique of the introduction of the land grant model in
Nigeria and Idachaba (1998) for a discussion of the problems in implementing the state
agricultural university model in Nigeria.
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components of the triangle? A recent World Bank review of its
expenditures on research, extension, and education sheds light on
this question. The review found that agricultural higher education
received about 2% and agricultural research and extension received




(Table 1). How did Africa fare
under this US$ 4.8 billion
package? During 1987–1997,
the World Bank made six
loans to agricultural higher
education totaling US$ 108
million. Three of those loans
were for Africa.
East and Central Africa
The bread-and-butter issues in strengthening agricultural
knowledge triangles in East and Central Africa are extremely
complex because of the colonial legacy, the large number of
agricultural institutions in the region, the institutional preferences of
a multiplicity of donors, and the fragmentation of agriculture and
natural resources within universities into separate faculties of
agriculture, forestry, and environmental sciences (Mrema 1997;
Norman 1998). Table 2 shows that there are currently 35 faculties of
agriculture, forestry, and veterinary medicine in the ten countries in
East and Central Africa. With 35 faculties, there is an obvious
duplication of effort in the region, which leads us to ask, “Why can’t
the faculties of agriculture and forestry be merged in some of these
universities?” Because of the large number of faculties of agriculture
and forestry in the region, most donors do not have an adequate
information base for deciding which faculty or faculties to support
in the region.
Table 1. World Bank global support
for agricultural research, extension,
and agricultural higher education,
1987–1997
Mil. US$ Percent
Agricultural research $2,482 51.50






Virtually all the faculties of agriculture and forestry in East and
Central Africa are under financial stress, poorly organized, and
losing senior staff to NGOs and the private sector. Two examples
illustrate the problems in building high-quality graduate programs in
agriculture in East and Central Africa. The first example
demonstrates the problem of staffing and sustaining regional MSc
programs; the second example pertains to offering PhD degrees in
the region.
Regionalization of training is frequently mentioned as a way to
drive down the unit cost of graduate programs. However, there is a
large gap between the theory and practice of offering a MSc degree
Faculties
Country University Agriculture Forestry Vet. Med.
Burundi Université du Burundi √ - -
Eritrea University of Asmara √ - -
Ethiopia Alemaya University of Agriculture √ √ -
Addis Ababa University - - √
Kenya University of Nairobi √ - √
Egerton University √ - -
Moi University √ √ -
Jomo Kenyatta University of S & T √ - -
University of Eastern Africa, Baraton √ - -
Madagascar Université d’Atananarivo √ - -
Rwanda Université Nationale du Rwanda √ - -
Sudan University of Khartoum √ √ √
University of Juba - √ -
University of Gezira √ - -
Red Sea University - (Fisheries) -
Bahr El Ghazal University √ √ -
Dongola University √ - -
El-Gadarif University √ √ -
Upper Nile University - √ -
Tanzania Sokoine University of Agriculture √ √ √
Uganda Makerere University √ √ √
Congo
(formerly Zaire) Université de Kinshasa √ √ -
Université de Lubumbashi - - √
Total 18 11 6
Source: ASARECA Strategic Plan Report (information supplied by Directors of NARIs); Mrema (1997).
Note: Total: 35 faculties of agricultural sciences.
Table 2. Universities in the ten East and Central African countries
with faculties of agricultural science
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for students from a region such as East and Central Africa. The
experience of the University of Nairobi illustrates this point. With
financial assistance from the government of Germany, the University
of Nairobi launched a MSc program in agricultural economics in
1974 for students from East Africa (Amann and Kriesel 1976; Thimm
1992). The two-year program consisted of coursework during the
first year and thesis research in the student’s home country during
the second year. Although it was exciting to teach courses to students
from East Africa, academic staff members found it difficult to find
the time and resources to travel to Uganda and Tanzania to supervise
the research of the MSc students from these countries. Also, because
of low salaries, funding constraints, and frequent university closures,
the University of Nairobi’s Department of Agricultural Economics
lost eight staff members with PhDs between 1985 and 1995 (Ackello-
Ogutu and Mwangi 1995). Finally, because of the lack of
scholarships, the intake of students from East Africa dried up in the
early 1990s. The total intake of students fell to three (all Kenyan) in
1997.39 This sobering case study of a 25-year effort to build and
sustain a MSc degree program (1974–1999) reveals that it is easy to
garner foreign aid to launch a regional MSc program but difficult to
gain local financial support to sustain a regional MSc degree
program, decade after decade.
The second example of the inherent complexity of building
high-quality graduate programs focuses on PhD level training. The
recent experience of Makerere University in Uganda illustrates how
difficult it is to secure funding and experienced scholars to teach up-
to-date courses, mentor students, and supervise PhD theses. Instead
of sending Ugandans to the United States for PhD training, Makerere
University launched an “alternative PhD program in agricultural
economics” in 1996. Eight American professors were recruited to
volunteer their time and teach a one-month PhD course at Makerere
on an accelerated basis (Wessell 1998). To date, eight PhD courses
39 The total intake of MSc students was as follows: 1989, 20; 1991, 12; 1993, 5; and 1997, 3.
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have been taught to nine Ugandan doctoral students. But World
Bank and USAID projects offer no funds to recruit visiting professors
to oversee the nine students during their research, analysis, and
writing of PhD dissertations in Uganda. Again the easy task in PhD
training programs is to teach courses. The challenge is to mobilize
local financial support to recruit, reward, and retain a cadre of
dedicated indigenous academic staff members who enjoy the
challenge of recruiting, teaching, mentoring, and supervising the
research of students.
The Particular Case of Kenya
After 36 years of independence, Kenya’s public agricultural
institutions are in serious disarray. There is an on-going debate over
the mandate, relevance, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability of the
five university faculties of agriculture, the T&V extension model, and
the sustainability of KARI. Presently, the linkages between the three
supply-driven components—research, extension, and universities—
are weak. Agricultural research is the strongest component in the
triangle, but KARI is currently dependent on donor assistance for
around 60% of its budget. KARI has just completed a major research
priority-setting exercise and a major human capital building
program, and it is an innovator in biotechnology. KARI’s
Agricultural Research Fund has been effective in encouraging
researchers from the universities and the private sector to conduct
research consistent with KARI’s research priorities. In addition,
KARI’s managers are aggressively trying to develop a leaner and
more demand-driven organization. Meanwhile, Kenya’s T&V
extension model is now being reconsidered. Major problems facing
extension include the shortage of operating budgets and a lack of
solid field evidence that the T&V model is effective, efficient, and
fiscally sustainable.40
40 For an exchange of views on T&V extension in Kenya, see Bindlish and Evenson (1997);
Picciotto and Anderson (1997); Anderson (1998); and Murethi and Anderson (1998).
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Agricultural higher education is the weakest component in the
triangle; furthermore, the quality of agricultural training has
deteriorated over the past decade. From 1970 to 1985, the University
of Nairobi was known for its high-quality undergraduate training
and research programs and its emerging graduate programs in many
disciplines, including agriculture. But four new public universities
were added from 1984 to 1994, with each new university adding a
faculty of agriculture. During this period, politics was injected into
the academy, and in the mid-1980s, the ruling party forced all public
universities to double their intake of students. The decision to double
intake resulted in a sharp drop in staff morale and the quality of the
academic experience, as well as an exodus of senior academics to
more attractive opportunities in southern Africa, overseas
universities, and the private sector (Oniang’o and Eicher 1998).
Kenya’s experience in trying to develop a national university of
agriculture is sobering. Egerton College was launched in 1941 by
Lord and Lady Egerton “to train sons and daughters of farmers the
science and practices of agriculture.”41 In 1988, Egerton College was
upgraded to Egerton University and given a mandate to become a
national university of agriculture. But politics intervened and
Egerton was encouraged to admit a large number of students to its
Faculty of Education. 42 Gradually, Egerton was transformed into a
general purpose university; today, it is experiencing great difficulty
in retaining its senior academic staff. Table 3 shows that Egerton’s
Faculty of Agriculture is made up largely of junior academic staff (50
assistant lecturers and 51 lecturers). The table also shows that out of
135 faculty members, only six are senior academic staff; four of those
are associate professors and two are professors for the six
departments in the Faculty of Agriculture. The Department of
Agricultural Economics has only one PhD in residence out of a total
41 Geoffrey Mrema, personal communication, November 21, 1998.
42 Many secondary school graduates did not have the necessary grades in science to be admitted
to the faculties of science, agriculture, etc.
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of 25 academic staff members. The capacity of Egerton’s Faculty of
Agriculture to offer high-quality graduate degrees in agriculture is
problematic because of the exodus of senior academic staff, political
meddling, and financial stress.
Without question, the quality of graduate education in faculties
of agriculture and forestry is crucially dependent on the presence of
senior academic staff at the rank of associate professor and professor,
because they must take the initiative in mentoring junior faculty
members and setting the research direction and tone of graduate
education. Senior academics also play a crucial role in mobilizing
funds for graduate student research and monitoring the completion
of degrees.
Another sensitive question concerns the issue of size and
critical mass. During the 1980s, Kenya increased the number of
faculties of agriculture from one to five, but the quality of the
educational experience suffered as budgets were stretched. For
example, in 1993/94, the University of Nairobi’s Department of
Agricultural Economics had a budget of US$ 532 for supplies. With
five university faculties of agriculture, one may legitimately ask: Has
Kenya made the same historical (and probably irreversible) mistake
as Belgium? Because of language differences, Belgium, a nation of 10
Assistant Senior Associate
Department Lecturer Lecturer Lecturer Professor Professor Total
Ag Econ/Business
Management 9 13 3 25
Agronomy 5 11 11 1 28
Animal Science 11 6 9 1 27
Dairy Food
Science/Technology 2 8 10
Horticulture 17 6 1 2 26
Natural Resources 6   8 3 2 19
Total 50 52 27 4 2 135
Source: Ekwamu et al. (1998).
Table 3. Kenya: Academic staff in the Faculty of Agriculture,
Egerton University, 1998
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million people, has four universities with a faculty of agriculture. By
contrast, the Netherlands, a nation of 35 million people, has one
world-class agricultural university—Wageningen.
These bread-and-butter examples of restructuring agricultural
institutions in East Africa, and particularly Kenya, help explain why
social scientists need to conduct research on the process of crafting
demand-driven agricultural knowledge triangles (Eyzaguirre 1996).
The task before us is to figure out how to build country-level
agricultural knowledge triangles that are operationally linked to
farmer organizations, the private sector, and the regional and global
scientific communities. But in East Africa, and especially Kenya, this
task is fraught with political obstacles because politicians are giving
priority to the expansion of undergraduate education. Also, many
donors have pulled back from universities and are now giving
priority to agricultural research, extension, and NGOs. Likewise,
with the cutback in donor funding for overseas training, donors
have hastily and prematurely dropped the responsibility for
graduate training into the lap of local universities. The deans of
agriculture, forestry, and veterinary science in East and Central
Africa are trying to develop strong linkages with ASARECA.43
The privatization of public agricultural services accompanying
structural adjustment programs is attracting senior academics and
undermining the capacity of universities in East Africa to offer high
quality local MSc and PhD degree training. Currently, there is a tug-
of-war between private consulting firms, policy institutes, and the
public universities for experienced agricultural scientists and
managers. The latest attempts to strengthen one discipline at a time
(e.g., AERC’s program to strengthen economics) in East and Central
Africa are unlikely to be fiscally sustainable. The bottom line is that
public universities, the rapidly expanding private consulting firms,
43 ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and
Central Africa).
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and policy research institutes all need each other. This need
reinforces the necessity to get on with crafting country agricultural
research triangles that nurture these symbiotic public and
private partnerships.
Challenges
The overarching development challenge facing African
agricultural scientists and policymakers today is how to help Africa’s
48 independent nations rediscover their agrarian heritage, bury Afro-
Pessimism, take charge of the foreign aid agenda, and mount a
disciplined, long-term effort to develop a modern agriculture. But
African leaders are feeling frustrated by the reluctance of donors to
take a long-term approach to capacity and institution building. For
example, in 1995, the World Bank appointed a group of eminent
Africans to form a working party and report to the World Bank on
the progress being made by the multi-donor African Capacity
Building Initiative (ACBI). The working party, chaired by the
distinguished Kenyan economist Harris Mule, presented its report to
the World Bank in October 1996. The following passage was among
the report’s highlights:
The World Bank is a major player in Africa’s development and its
interventions have major impacts on the pace and pattern of Africa’s
development in general, and capacity building in particular. It is not easy
for outsiders to gauge how far the Bank has been successful in promoting
capacity building in Africa. Many of the recent Bank statements on
capacity building are, however, impeccable, and have played an important
role in placing capacity building issues on the African policy agenda....
Yet these initiatives, important though they are, are mere additions to the
Bank’s main mission, which is lending. There is no evidence that they are
pursued with the same enthusiasm and vigor as, for example, policy-based
lending. This is in spite of the fact that without capacity, the impact of the
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Bank’s operations, whether on project or policy-based lending, will have
below optimal results (Mule 1996).
Despite these frustrations, it seems fair to pose the question:
Why should donors invest in long-term capacity building in Africa
when African political leaders engage in cross border wars, purchase
fancy jets, build unneeded international airports, and readily tolerate
corruption? Even if donors agree to help support capacity-building
programs, there is an absence of intellectual agreement on how to
build agricultural knowledge triangles for 48 countries with seven
colonial histories.
In light of these frustrations and powerful crosscurrents, what
can African agriculturalists do to mobilize African and donor
support to plan and implement a disciplined, balanced, accretionary
long-term program to build a system of institutional pillars for a
modern agriculture? I emphasize balanced and accretionary because
many donors have offered generous short-term support for one or
two of the pillars (e.g., extension or research). The World Bank, for
example, has been generous in supporting research and extension
projects, but it allocated only 2% of its global US$ 4.8 billion research,
education, and extension expenditures to agricultural higher
education over the 1987–1997 period. I have already underscored the
futility of seeking a recipe for building institutions in the large,
complex, and diverse continent of Africa. Rather, attention should be
directed to eight challenges that require further study and debate.
The first two challenges call for Africans to step forward and provide
some long overdue political and scientific leadership.
Challenges Ahead
1. Creating a “good institutional environment”
In this lecture, I focused attention on building the three cost-
effective public organizations—research, extension, and training—
that form the agricultural knowledge triangle, because these
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organizations are essential for a modern agriculture. Although public
organizations are necessary, they are not, in and of themselves, a
sufficient condition for agricultural development. To be effective,
public organizations must be nurtured, protected, financed, and
rewarded by a “good institutional environment.” Such an
environment includes a transparent legal system, protection of
property rights, stable macroeconomic conditions, and political
participation of farmers and commodity groups. In addition, once a
good institutional environment is established, it requires unusual
political skill to maintain it over time.44
African leaders must take responsibility for building a good
institutional (political) environment for development. After a good
institutional environment is in place, the next step is for the
agricultural leadership—both public and private—to encourage
political leaders to concentrate on the first generation problem of
accelerating the rate of agricultural growth. The next step is to craft
demand-driven agricultural knowledge triangles that are
operationally linked to and supported by farm organizations, the
private sector, and the global scientific community.
2. Crafting agricultural knowledge triangles
I have stressed the basic point that research, extension, and
agricultural higher education are complementary activities and that
the collective return on investments in these activities will be higher
if they are interlinked rather than pursued separately. But designing
a triangle that achieves sequential continuity in these three
investments requires a rare skill that is not covered in the basic
textbooks on project appraisal. Crafting is a process—an intensely
political process. The University of Nairobi’s 25-year attempt to
develop a sustainable, regional master’s degree program in
agricultural economics is a classic example of an organizational
44 The current difficulties that universities, extension, and research organizations face in Kenya,
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria illustrate what happens when political leaders allow a good
institutional environment to deteriorate.
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experiment that was financed by the North but never supported by
the national or regional governments, in this instance, Kenya’s
political leadership and its Ministry of Finance.
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of vision in Africa, in donor
communities, and in academia on how to craft demand-driven
agricultural knowledge triangles and how to achieve sequential
continuity of the core investments. In light of this vacuum, I
recommend that a one-year moratorium be imposed on all proposed
donor-financed research, extension, and higher education projects in
Africa. Those 12 months should be used to buy time to allow African
agriculturalists and donor representatives to come together and
figure out (1) how to develop demand-driven agricultural research
triangles; (2) how the leaders of separately governed organizations
(research, extension, and faculties of agriculture) can communicate
and cooperate; (3) how the triangles can be linked to and supported
by the local and national political processes; and (4) what donors can
do to assist in the crafting process.
3. The case for long-term scientific assistance
Starting in the mid-1980s, many development specialists
pointed out the shortcomings of long-term technical assistance and
recommended its rapid phase out together with a build-up of
African consulting firms and the transfer of training from overseas to
African universities.45 But this blanket approach to the localization of
human capital improvement has some flaws. There is growing
evidence that overseas training in agriculture is being prematurely
phased down, before African universities have had the time to
mobilize resources and a national political commitment to build and
sustain high-quality local MSc degree programs. I recommend a
gradual phase down of overseas training at the MSc level over the
coming decade, coupled with an intense dialogue with ministries of
finance on financing local MSc training programs.
45 Also see Berg (1993) and Jaycox (1993, 1997).
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Turning to technical assistance, a new type of long-term
technical assistance—scientific technical assistance—should be
introduced to help shore up graduate training programs and
develop African research capacity in such areas as intellectual
property rights, biodiversity, agribusiness, and information systems.
Surely a cadre of 500 scientists from industrial nations, spread over
48 countries during the coming 25 to 50 years, would have a high
payoff. The scientists should be posted in universities, national
agricultural research institutes (NARIs), and ministries of science
and technology.
The issue of long-term scientific technical assistance in
agriculture is closely related to the new initiative to build advanced
scientific institutes in Latin America, which has been under
discussion for more than a year, thanks to the leadership of
President Eduardo Frei of Chile. Several Latin American
governments, private foundations, and the World Bank are
preparing a plan to develop a global chain of so-called Millennium
Institutes that will serve as scientific centers in developing countries
(Macilwain 1998). Initial plans call for the establishment of centers
in middle-income countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and
Colombia. If the concept proves successful, it will be promoted in
Asia and Africa. Hopefully, the architects of the Millennium
Institutes for Africa will study the history of similar projects in
Africa over the past 40 years (Eicher 1989; Court 1991; Coleman and
Court 1993; and Ajayi et al. 1996).
4. Expanded aid agenda
In the early 1960s, three major donor organizations, USAID,
the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, worked
together closely to help India build an effective system of
institutional pillars (research, extension, and education) for a
modern agriculture (Lele and Goldsmith 1989). The government of
India proved to be a superb innovator as it set up a number of new
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institutions such as the state agricultural university system (Busch
1988), the Agricultural Prices Commission, and Fair Price Shops. But
donor coordination has proven to be much more difficult in Africa
than it was in India because of the large number of donors in Africa,
changing donor fashions, and the broadening of the development
agenda to the point where agriculture has been marginalized in
many donor agencies. USAID’s experience dramatically illustrates
how agriculture has been marginalized over the past decade. In 1985,
USAID allocated the largest share of its Africa budget to agriculture
(47%) and it provided scholarships to 250 Africans for overseas
training in agriculture (USAID 1985). In 1998, USAID allocated only
10% of its Africa budget to agriculture (USAID 1998) and provided
scholarships to around 20 African students for overseas long-term
training in agriculture (Atwood 1998).
What is driving this shift in donor priorities away from human
capital improvement and old-fashioned agricultural development
and economic growth? Two icons in development economics, John
Mellor and Anne Krueger, have addressed this question. Mellor
recently commented on why it is so difficult to get donors to focus on
agricultural growth in Africa:
Foreign aid is now captive to a myriad of special groups. Today they include
child survival, vitamin A, microcredit, poverty, microenterprise (excluding
agriculture), empowerment of women, environment, wildlife preservation,
and on and on. Extrapolation of the history of special interests in foreign
aid suggests that tomorrow the list will be different and longer. Priorities
and strategy cannot coexist with such a panoply of special interests, each
with its own objectives (Mellor 1998b).
Stanford economist and former World Bank Vice President
Anne Krueger argues that the World Bank has made a mistake in
taking on “soft issues” such as environmental matters, cooperation
with NGOs, and combating corruption. She contends that “a strong
48
case can be made that the Bank has moved far beyond its essential
competence in addressing these issues, and in so doing, has
overstretched the capacity of its staff” (Krueger 1998). But in light of
recent events in Indonesia and Zimbabwe, one can challenge
Krueger on her description of corruption as a “soft issue.” Without
question, corruption is a core issue in Africa and one must applaud
the World Bank for trying to address it. Nevertheless, one can agree
with Krueger’s general concern over the World Bank’s broadened
agenda. World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz recently laid out a
“new paradigm for development” that includes participation,
decentralization, and community development (Stiglitz 1998).
Hopefully, World Bank staff  will study the failure of the community
development movement of the 1950s and Robert McNamara’s ill-
timed and poorly executed IRD thrust of the 1970s.
To summarize, the broadened development agenda of donors
makes it difficult for African governments to garner donor support
for a long-term attack on Africa’s human capital degradation and its
ineffective agricultural institutions.
5. Changing roles of public and private institutions and NGOs
What are the most productive roles for public, private, and
NGO institutions in supporting African farmers, traders, and
agribusiness firms? There are many ideological positions on this
issue, but there is little hard evidence on the performance of various
types of public, private, and NGO organizations over time. However,
we can glean some insights from Zimbabwe’s experience in laying
the foundation for increasing maize production:
♦ The government—not Oxfam—developed Zimbabwe’s
impressive all-weather road network.
♦ The government—not private seed companies—conducted
research for 28 years (1932–1960) that led to the development
of the SR-52 hybrid that increased maize yields by 40%.
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♦ Commercial farmers—not external pressure—developed a
politically powerful farm organization that made the case in
the Parliament for public investments in research and farmer
support organizations (Eicher 1995).
Zimbabwe’s experience highlights the strategic importance of
an active government role in the early stage of development, because
private traders are unlikely to deliver research, extension, and credit
services to smallholders, especially those in remote areas (Blackie
1990). The state was the organizer and risk-taker in developing
Zimbabwe’s all-weather road network, agricultural research system,
and its extension service. Zimbabwe’s private sector has slowly
taken on a greater role in maize breeding, seed distribution, and the
marketing of new high-value export crops. Avoiding dogmatism is
critical when considering what should be done by the state or the
private sector and when examining the sequencing and changing
roles of the public and private sectors and NGOs over time
(Bonnen 1998; Echeverria 1998).
6. Institution building vs. marginalist approaches
Over the past 40 years, the pendulum for building Africa’s
human capital and scientific capacity has shifted from building new
institutions (i.e., the supply side approach) to a more delimited or
marginalist approach. Most of the current capacity-building
programs can be classified as marginalist. Donors have made this
shift because of on-going civil wars, the failure of large-scale
institution-building projects, and a growing awareness of the length
of time involved in institution building. Currently, short-term
capacity-building initiatives are in vogue in donor circles. These
include support for commodity research networks (Robinson 1998)
and strengthening a single discipline, such as economics under the
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) (Fine 1997).
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On the issue of time, two scholars studying the experience of
the Rockefeller Foundation’s University Development Program
(UDP), which assisted 15 universities in 12 countries for 20 years
(1963 to 1983), concluded that “a high concentration of resources
over a short period of time can result in a ‘too much, too soon’
syndrome” (Coleman and Court 1993). If the Rockefeller Foundation
discovered that 20 years was too short of a time to build strong and
effective universities, what does one infer from this experience for
the architects of the marginalist approaches that are now in vogue?
The lesson that I draw is that time and sustainability should be kept
in mind as donors finance an increasing number of commodity
networks and draw up 10-year plans to develop “sustainable” PhD
programs in Africa.
African and Western scholars should challenge the misleading
time optimism that is now conventional wisdom in development
circles. Without question there is a need to mount a major effort to
strengthen the agriculture knowledge triangle over the next 25
to 50 years.
7. Graduate education: strategic issues
Undergraduate education is the bread-and-butter of African
university education, and the political pressure to increase
undergraduate enrollment is relentless. Nevertheless, the urgency to
set up African-based graduate programs is dramatized by two
sobering facts. First, as few as 20 Africans a year currently receive
doctorates in economics from all sources, both within the continent
(including South Africa) and outside of it (Fine 1997). Second, Ghana
has been independent for 42 years and “no Ghanian university has
ever produced a PhD in Economics” (Jebuni 1998). When the AERC
was launched in 1988, it carried out a study of graduate education in
economics in Africa and found that “graduate training in any
meaningful sense appeared to have collapsed in most universities.”
The study attributed this to the following systemic causes: “lack of
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funds, civil disorder, loss of good staff, deteriorating faculties and
equipment, and a massive expansion of undergraduate enrollment”
(Fine 1997). Many donors and foundations have responded to these
issues by “pulling the plug” on overseas training (prematurely in my
judgement), thus accelerating the devolution of graduate training in
Africa. However, the Africanization of graduate education is
occurring precisely when the quality of undergraduate education in
Africa is declining because of the rapid proliferation of faculties of
agriculture, forestry, and MSc programs, and a “meltdown” in the
capacity in some fields (especially agricultural economics and
economics) to offer high-quality MSc degree programs. A number of
sub-regional (e.g., southern Africa) MSc degree programs are now
being introduced throughout Africa, but the experience of the
University of Nairobi’s MSc program in agricultural economics for
East Africa illustrates the difficulty of securing local financial
support to sustain these programs over the long term.
In summary, African universities are being summoned to take
on the second generation challenge—expanding graduate
education—at a time when politicians are promoting a relentless
expansion of undergraduate enrollment. Foreign aid-financed
overseas training is being prematurely phased out. Without question,
overseas PhD training in many fields of agriculture will be needed
for many decades. The complex issues involved in building graduate
education capacity in Africa require further study and debate.
8. Whither the CGIAR?
What is the role of the CGIAR in capacity building in Africa?
What has transpired since my critique of the CGIAR in the early
1990s (Eicher 1992, 1994)? In 1992, I argued that the CGIAR
management had taken a wrong turn in the road when they
increased the number of CGIAR centers from 13 to 1846 and that the
CGIAR was overburdened with secondary tasks at the expense of
46 Today, the CGIAR comprises16 centers.
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that which was essential. Looking back, it is clear that the addition of
five new centers was driven by valid substantive concerns to expand
research on natural resources and the environment, and the desire of
some bilateral donors to find a permanent home (in the CGIAR) for
some of the non-affiliated centers that they had been supporting. The
financial stress following the expansion is partially a result of the
failure of donors to provide a commensurate increase in the budget
to support the expanded mandate and the addition of five new
centers. To address the noticeable loss of momentum of the CGIAR
system in the 1980s, I declared that there was
an urgent need for the Chairman of the CGIAR system to appoint a high-
level Commission of four eminent scientists and four CGIAR members to
study alternative management structures for the 21st Century. The
Commission should be financed by a foundation(s) and given 24 months
to prepare a White Paper with a recommended management structure. A
new management model should be in place by Centers Week of 1994
(Eicher 1992).
Six years later, the Strong Report was presented at the 1998 Annual
Meeting of the Centers. The Strong Report falls far short of resolving
the tough problems facing the CGIAR and posed by the Africa
question, which is the Achilles’ heel of the system. It remains to be
seen whether follow-up studies will satisfactorily resolve the
unfinished work of the expert panel.
Since the CGIAR centers are spending 40–44% of their
collective budget on Africa, it is important to examine the CGIAR’s
record of capacity-building there. One can applaud WARDA’s
initiative in setting up the rice research network and IFPRI’s decision
in 1992 to help strengthen the Bunda Faculty of Agriculture in
Malawi, as well as IFPRI’s recent move to establish similar programs
in Ghana and Mozambique. But one wonders whether IFPRI can
mobilize the required funds and stay the course for the 10–20 years
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that are required for building MSc capability in faculties of
agriculture that are in their infancy. Indeed, after seven years of
assistance to the MSc program in agricultural economics in Malawi,
IFPRI has withdrawn its support (except for short-term consultants)
and shifted its attention to strengthening the Faculty of Agronomy
in Mozambique. In retrospect, it may have been prudent for IFPRI
to have helped the University of Zimbabwe strengthen its regional
MSc program in agricultural economics and urged Malawians to
pursue their MSc degrees in Zimbabwe.
The WARDA and IFPRI examples illustrate how difficult it is
for CGIAR centers to mobilize adequate resources for long-term
capacity-building programs in Africa. The budgets available to
CGIAR centers are extremely modest relative to those of
agricultural experiment stations in the United States. For example,
in 1997, the budget of the Michigan State University Agricultural
Experiment Station (AES) was US$ 65.6 million. The AES has 141
tenure-stream (permanent) faculty members serving a clientele of
51,000 Michigan farms, comprising 8,000 full-time commercial
farms, 16,000 part-time farms, and 27,000 “hobby farms.”47 When I
juxtapose CIMMYT’s 1997 budget of US$ 30.6 million, alongside its
global mandate for maize and wheat, and its economics, natural
resources, and biotechnology programs, I am forced to conclude
that CIMMYT should move cautiously before embarking on new
programs to combat human capital degradation in Africa. Instead
of each CGIAR center trying to resolve this dilemma, the entire
CGIAR system should address the following question: What can
the CGIAR collectively do to help accelerate the development of
Africa’s scientific capacity in food, agriculture, and natural
resources?
47 Commercial farms have annual sales of over US$ 100,000 per year; part-time farms have sales
of US$ 10,000–99,000 per year, and hobby farms have sales of less than US$ 10,000 per year.
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